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Abstract
From an academic clinical psychological perspective, mental health problems are seen as existing
on a number of continua with normal functioning, rather than being explicable in terms of
categorical diagnoses. Clinical Psychologists use clinical case formulations in their professional
practice and are critical of the validity and utility of diagnosis. Psychologists also see mental health
problems as stemming from disturbances in psychological processes. In turn, these processes may
be disrupted by a variety of causes – biological, social and psychological. Nevertheless, we see
disturbance or impairment of such psychological processes as the central issue in mental ill health.
Mental health legislation should therefore reflect these perspectives in terms of the criteria for
compulsory treatment and in terms of the procedures and practices governing care.
To an extent this is welcome in the Government’s current proposals for mental health legislative
reform. A basis of compulsion based on criteria rather than diagnosis is proposed, as are care plans
rather than diagnosis and treatment. Clinical psychology, however, would go further. Since there
seem to be differences between ‘well’ and ‘ill’ in terms only of the degree and nature of the
disturbance of psychological process and the impact on functioning, this speaks to the nature of
‘unsoundness of mind’. Clinical psychologists contend that it follows that mental health legislation
is appropriate and necessary only if people are impaired in their judgement to the extent of being
unable to make valid decisions for themselves.
It has been proposed that Clinical Psychologists could act as ‘clinical supervisors’ (the term which
is to replace ‘responsible medical officers’). If, indeed, mental ill health is the disturbance of
complex, inter-related psychological processes, it makes perfect sense to employ psychologists to
coordinate care and decision-making. Clinical psychologists are ready to take their place as
partners with lawyers and psychiatrists.
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Clinical psychologists 
Clinical psychologists are scientist-practitioners. We act as theoreticians, academics and
researchers. We are also therapists and care managers. When working as therapists, we act as
applied scientists – building on our research expertise and knowledge of the scientific literature to
develop psychotherapeutic and other solutions through the systematic application of this analysis.
The core skills of a clinical psychologist are: assessment, formulation, intervention and
evaluation1. Assessment of psychological processes and behaviour is different from diagnosis,
partly in the way in which the results of these assessments are placed within the context of the
historical and developmental processes that will have shaped an individual.
Formulation is the summation and integration of the knowledge that is acquired by this assessment
process2. Psychological formulations attempt to explain why people are experiencing difficulties.
They usually consist of a list of problems and possible psychological reasons for these3. Typically,
a formulation will examine what events have happened in a person’s life, and how they have
interpreted and reacted to these. Formulations tend to change as the psychologists and their clients
learn more about the problems. Formulations are designed to be hypotheses about the problems,
which are tested out over time4. For example, a clinical psychologist might tentatively hypothesise
that childhood sexual abuse may be important in the development of a client’s problems. This
would be explored, sensitively, in therapy in order to confirm or disconfirm the possibility and, if
confirmed, to develop a therapeutic response. Psychological case formulations are complex.
Psychologists are trained to link theory with practice, and therefore a formulation may comprise a
number of provisional hypotheses, based on a large variety of psychological theories, each drawing
on scientific research. 
Intervention, if appropriate, is based on the formulation. This may involve one of the
psychological therapies, but may involve training, supervision or the supply of expert evidence.
The nature of the phenomenon 
Continua
Psychologists recognise that each individual’s experiences are unique5. Diagnoses such as
‘schizophrenia’, ‘manic depression’ and ‘personality disorders’ have limited utility, validity and
reliability. If a diagnosis is valid, it should predict prognosis. However, for example, the outcome
for people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia is extremely variable6. Diagnoses should also have
‘prognostic validity’. They should indicate what treatments will be effective. Again, however,
responses to medication appear to follow from the individual problems a person is experiencing,
rather than the diagnosis they receive. In one notable study, for example, people were randomly
1 British Psychological Society Division of Clinical
Psychology (2001) The Core Purpose and Philosophy of
the Profession. British Psychological Society, Leicester.
2 Hawton, K., Salkovskis, P. M., Kirk, J., & Clark, D.
M. (Eds.). (1989). Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for
Psychiatric Problems: A Practical Guide. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
3 Persons, J. B. (1989). Cognitive therapy in practice: A
case formulation approach (Vol. 41). London: W.
Norton & Company.
4 Brewin, C.R. (1988). Cognitive foundations of clinical
psychology. London: Lawrence Erlbaum.
5 British Psychological Society Division of Clinical
Psychology (2000) Understanding Mental Illness and
Psychotic Experiences: A Report by the British
Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology.
Leicester: British Psychological Society
6 Boyle, M. (1990) Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?
London: Routledge.
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assigned to receive different medication. Delusions and hallucinations responded to antipsychotic
medication and mood swings responded to lithium, irrespective of diagnosis7.
Statistical analysis, too, has revealed that the ‘symptoms’ of ‘illnesses’ do not, in reality, cluster
together in the way predicted by the diagnostic approach. For example8 the correlation amongst
psychotic symptoms has been found to be no greater than chance, and cluster analysis does not
reveal patterns recognisable as diagnostic categories9.
The central issue in diagnosis is one of classification – the idea that particular psychological
problems cluster together and can therefore be considered together. Plato referred to this as
“carving nature at the joints”10. If diagnosis ‘carves nature at the joints’, it is assumed that the
problems called ‘schizophrenia’ are different from the problems called ‘bipolar disorder’ in the
same way that the breast of a chicken is different from the leg. On the basis of the evidence
reviewed above, many psychologists believe that these distinctions are invalid, that diagnostic
approaches to psychological problems do not reflect real ‘joints’ in nature. 
This can (hopefully memorably) be summarised as suggesting that mental health is a sausage, not a
chicken. You can identify the ends of a sausage, and distinguish them from the middle. You can
even choose to cut out a burnt bit. But there are no joints at which to carve, just decisions to be
made. With respect to mental health legislation, an important practical conclusion follows. 
We cannot separate humanity into ‘mentally ill’ and ‘healthy’. The distinctions between those 
‘of unsound mind’ and those of us lucky enough to avoid the Mental Health Act are subtle. 
They are also judgements about where to draw lines on continua. Similar continua exist in law and
medicine that may be informative in comparison. Obesity is a useful and important term. But the
spread of ‘fatness’ in the community is continuous. It makes sense on practical and clinical
grounds to draw a line at a particular point on that continuum to distinguish the ‘obese’ from the
rest. Or, in law, it makes sense to draw a line between adults and minors. But nobody believes that
there is a developmental discontinuity on the stroke of midnight of an adolescent’s 18th birthday.
‘Adulthood’ is determined pragmatically. And it differs and is flexible. Laws related to sexual
consent, voting, standing for parliament, driving etc, use (for eminently reasonable reasons)
different cut-off points. And rulings like Gillick11 suggest that the ‘fuzziness’ of these distinctions
is recognised by the judiciary. Yet, at present the law, like medicine, relies heavily on dichotomous
distinctions – guilty vs not guilty, negligent vs not liable, competent vs incompetent, well vs ill.
Adherence to a continuum model would imply the need for a psycho-legal enquiry into this
interface.
7 Moncrieff, J. (1997) Lithium: evidence reconsidered.
British Journal of Psychiatry 171 113–119.
8 Slade, P.D. and Cooper, R. (1979) Some conceptual
difficulties with the term “schizophrenia”: an
alternative model. British Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology. 18: 309–317.
9 Everitt, B.S., Gourlay, A.J. and Kendell, R.E. (1971)
An attempt at validation of traditional psychiatric
syndromes by cluster analysis. British Journal of
Psychiatry 119: 399–412.
10 Hamilton, E. & Huntington, C. (1961) The Collected
Dialogues of Plato. Princeton University Press.
Princeton, N.J. p. 511.
11 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbeach AHA (1985) All
ER 373
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Psychological processes
The continua of dysfunction in mental health are related to the disturbance of normal psychological
processes. People who experience anxiety to the extent of receiving a diagnosis of an anxiety
disorder show extreme versions of relatively normal processes. We all pay attention to threats,
frightening things absorb our attention (we’d be in some danger if we ignored threats). Anxious
people seem to take this tendency further, overemphasising danger, catastrophically misinterpreting
signs of danger and ignoring material that signals safety. They may also excessively engage in normal
processes such as performing reassuring rituals. People who are depressed tend to interpret
information in a negative way. For example, they see the glass as half-empty, not half-full12. 
Such distortions of normal processes occur for explicable reasons. Traumatic, abusive or
unpleasant events during a person’s childhood can affect the way that the person interprets
information and reacts to events later in life. People with mental health problems commonly report
having had highly distressing or traumatic life experiences such as bereavements, abuse and
assault13. Because everybody interprets new events and challenges in the light of previous
experience, such experiences affect the ways people respond to life’s challenges and in the ways new
experiences are understood. 
One early theory of ‘schizophrenia’ was that it reflected a ‘loosening of connections’ in the brain14.
(That idea is reflected in the term ‘schizophrenia’ meaning ‘fragmented mind’). Psychotic
experiences such as hearing voices, unusual beliefs and ‘thought disorder’ appear to involve making
unusual connections between apparently unrelated events. This is not in itself either good or bad.
Sometimes making unusual connections between things is valuable, when it is termed ‘lateral
thinking’ or ‘creativity’. In fact, people who score highly on measures of ‘schizotypy’ also score
highly on measures of creativity15. It is even possible to imagine how the ability to make creative
connections could be a genetically inheritable trait. Many studies have shown that people who have
unusual or delusional beliefs tend to ‘jump to conclusions’ when faced with limited or
contradictory information16. 
Psychologists believe that many mental health difficulties result from a combination of these
normal, but distorted, processes. For example, if you are feeling confused and experiencing
overwhelming emotions, you may find it particularly hard to interpret other people’s actions and
intentions accurately. This might mean that interactions with other people are very anxiety
provoking and ambiguous. If the events in your life have led you to believe that people tend to
abuse and hurt you at every opportunity, and you also have a tendency (again exaggerated in a state
of stress) to jump to conclusions, it is understandable that you might occasionally feel paranoid.
12 Brewin, C. (1988). Cognitive foundations of clinical
psychology. London: Lawrence Erlbaum.
13 Romme, M.A.J. (1998) Understanding Voices: coping
with auditory hallucinations and confusing realities.
Runcorn, Cheshire: Handsell Publishing.
14 Bleuler, E. (1911/1950). Dementia praecox or the group
of schizophrenias (Zinkin, E., Trans.). New York:
International Universities Press
15 Schuldberg, D., French, C., Stone, B.L. & Heberle, J.
(1988) Creativity and schizotypal traits. Creativity test
scores and perceptual aberration, magical ideation, and
impulsive nonconformity. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Diseases. 176(11): 648–657.
16 Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988).
Probabilistic judgements in deluded and nondeluded
subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
40A, 801–812.
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Centrality of psychology
Such an analysis places psychology at the centre of mental health. While psychologists universally
acknowledge that biological factors and the social environment, together with psychosocial
experiences and learning, contribute to mental health, their perspective is that illustrated in Figure 1.
Psychologists do not believe that there are ‘genes for schizophrenia’ or even that ‘schizophrenia is
a brain disease’. Within a psychological perspective, a variety of factors must be considered to have
an impact on mental health, but not directly. Psychologists view biological, social, environmental
and psychological causes as having impacts on underlying or mediating psychological processes. 
It is dysfunction of these processes that results in mental ill health.
Figure 1. The relationship between causes, psychological processes and mental health.
Capacity
Within such a framework then, there are few valid places to ‘carve nature at the joints’ when it
comes to mental health. The central issue in mental ill health is the disturbance or impairment of
psychological processes. Such disturbances lie on continua. There are many such continua, because
there are many psychological processes that contribute to mental ill health.
In the context of mental health legislation, the most important continuum is impairment of
judgement. Many psychological dysfunctions impact on the ability to make sound and consensual
judgements. Impairment of judgement, or incapacity, also relates most appropriately to ‘being of
unsound mind’, 
The European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 of course
applies to mental health legislation, and includes the fundamental human right to liberty and security
of person (Article 5). It explicitly allows for exemptions in the case of persons ‘of unsound mind’.
This term is not defined in either the Convention or the Act, but case law some 23 years old has
referred to people with “real illnesses” (Winterwerp v The Netherlands, 1979)17. Clearly, people cannot
be considered to be unsound of mind warranting compulsory detention and treatment, merely by
virtue of having a diagnosable mental illness, since one person in four18 is likely to meet such a
criterion and this would imply that one can pass such a threshold if one has, for example, a phobia
of snakes. 
17 Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) EHRR 387 18 Kaplan,H & Sadock,B Comprehensive Textbook of
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And both the Mental Health Act 1983 and the present proposals for reform of that Act make
reference to mental disorder ‘of such a nature or degree’ as to warrant compulsory treatment. 
The ‘nature or kind’ of disturbance of psychological functioning that relates sensibly to ‘unsound
mind’ is the extent to which individuals are capable or incapable of making relevant decisions for
themselves.
The obvious implication is that people are of ‘unsound mind’ if they lack the capacity for making valid
consensual decisions. This is relatively straightforwardly tested by assessing a person’s ability “to
understand or retain the information relevant to the decision, including information about the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or another or of failing to make the decision”
and their ability “to make a decision based on that information” in respect to a particular decision19. 
Impairment of judgment, continua and personality disorder
An important aspect of present proposals to reform the Mental Heath Act is the focus on public
protection from people who are thought to pose a significant risk of serious harm to others. The
present proposals have been widely discussed and essentially permit presumptive and preventative
detention of people whom a professional believes might commit an offence. There is a definition
of a new group of high risk patients – people who are considered “high risk as a result of
Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorders”. This uses a broad, vague and circular definition of
‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, a definition yet to be subjected to empirical test. It is
circular because people are identified as having a personality disorder by virtue of certain
behaviours (including committing violent crimes), which are then seen as “arising from [the]
underlying disorder” to quote the White Paper.20
From a psychological perspective, there are serious scientific flaws in this stance. First, labels are
not causal explanations. One cannot have behaviours ‘arising from’ what is a socially-constructed
label describing those very behaviours. As with other psychological problems, continua clearly best
describe the true sate of affairs. To distinguish ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder’ from
normal behaviour may solve practical and political problems, but it is an arbitrary decision on a
rather vague continuum.
Many (but by no means all) people with a diagnosis of ‘personality disorder’ can be seen as having
legal ‘capacity’. The needs and risks of such people should be managed through consensual services
and criminal justice mechanisms respectively. Because such a legal framework does not exist, there
have not been legal, or psychological, tests of impaired judgement in personality disorder. But it is
relatively easy to see people who would meet the DSM-IV criteria for antisocial personality disorder
who retain capacity and also people with this label who would fail a test of capacity based on
impaired judgement. I have in mind a sexual predator who fails, or is unable, to appreciate the
seriously damaging consequences of his behaviour on his victims and their families. In the decisions
surrounding consensual sexual behaviour, such considerations appear vital to making valid
decisions. Depending on the case, of course, I could consider such vital failings in what is termed
‘theory-of-mind’ – appreciating the perspective of another – would render that person’s judgement
impaired to the point of being incapacitated with respect to that particular decision.
19 London. The Law Commission (1995) Report on
Mental Incapacity. The Stationery Office. London.)
20 Reforming the Mental Health Act. Part II. High Risk
Patients (Department of Health; the Home Office)
(2000) Cm 5016 – II.
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As well as being scientifically flawed, then, the present proposals are dangerous. People who have
committed no crimes, and who retain the capacity validly to decide their own lives will be subject
to compulsory detention and treatment under a mental health aegis because they are believed to
be potentially dangerous. People’s future dangerousness cannot reliably be predicted from their
mental health history.21 It can be predicted on the basis of past violent or criminal behaviour. 
The public could be better protected from dangerous individuals with a straightforward
amendment to sentencing policy – a change recommended by at least three government enquiries
or commissions.22 Unlike a spuriously medicalising mental health approach, such an approach
would be compatible with the Human Rights Act.
A variable threshold of impairment
Finally, impairments of judgement themselves are best thought of as lying on a continuum – or a
series of criteria, individual to the different judgments. Legal criteria should, logically, differ for
different situations. The legal tests of unfitness to plead, not guilty by reason of insanity, and
diminished responsibility all imply capacity and impairment of judgement. It is not unreasonable
to suggest that the legal thresholds necessary for judging capacity in respect to decisions involving
no risk, risk to self and risk to others may be different. We do, of course, have different criteria
for assessing the competence of judgement-making capacity necessary to sanction allowing people
to decide how to organise their own personal relationships and the judgement-making competence
considered sufficient to license a person as a barrister – capable of representing one’s clients in a
court of law – or a psychologist – capable of assessing competence!
The role of the Clinical Psychologist
The government is proposing that the current ‘Responsible Medical Officer’ role should be
replaced by that of ‘Clinical Supervisor’, and that Clinical Psychologists could fill this role.23
If, indeed, mental ill health is the disturbance of complex, inter-related psychological processes, it
makes perfect sense to employ psychologists to coordinate care and decision-making. This paper
should be interpreted, in part, as a call for psychological understanding to be placed centre-stage
in mental health legislation.
Some psychologists welcome this development, seeing it as a means of introducing psychological
perspectives into decisions about compulsory treatment, whilst others fear that it might
compromise our professional values. In a recent survey, however, 70% of clinical psychologists
responding stated that the profession of psychology should be open to this development, and 51%
stated that they would be willing to be a clinical supervisor if offered appropriate training.24
Such responses should not be taken to imply approval of other plans for reform. Eighty-two
percent of respondents agreed that people should only be subject to mental health legislation if
their judgement is (permanently or temporarily) impaired to the extent that they are incapable of
21 Bonta J, Law M, Hanson K. (1998) The prediction of
criminal and violent recidivism among mentally
disordered offenders: a meta-analysis. Psychological
Bulletin. 123: 123–142.
22 For example, the Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into the Personality Disorder Unit, Ashworth Special
Hospital (1999) Cm 4194 – II. The Stationery Office.
23 See Paragraph 29 of Draft Mental Health Bill
Explanatory Notes, Department of Health (2002) Cm
5538 – II. The Stationery Office.
24 Cooke, A, Kinderman, P. & Harper, D. (2002)
Criticisms and concerns: Results of a survey of DCP
members opinions about proposed reforms to the 1983
Mental Health Act. Clinical Psychology. 13: 43–47.
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making the relevant decisions for themselves, and 84% agreed that to call someone who is
habitually violent “personality disordered” is circular and adds nothing to our understanding of
the causes of, or likely remedy for, such behaviour.
Summary 
Mental ill-health is, essentially and centrally, a psychological issue. Mental ill-health should be seen
as the consequence of dysfunctional or impaired psychological processes, These processes may be
impaired by biological, social, environmental or psychological factors, but such factors impact on
mental health through psychological factors. Both mental health legislation and mental health care
should reflect this reality. Individual multidisciplinary case formulations should be the basis of
care. Incapacity – impairment of decision-making ability – should be the basis of mental health
legislation.
With respect to the present Government proposals, the British Psychological Society welcomes the
use of specific functional criteria under a broad remit of ‘mental disorder’. Psychologists, however,
echo the concerns of the Health Select Committee, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and others
that the current criteria remain over-broad, and likewise recommend the use of further limiting
criteria.
The British Psychological Society therefore calls for the inclusion of a further specific criterion
before compulsory care is legitimised. This would entail that the “the mental disorder is of a
nature or severity so as to impair the individuals’ judgement to the extent that the individual is
incapable of giving or withholding valid consent with regard to a particular issue or issues
addressed by the care plan”.
Psychologists believe that such a criterion, coupled with the existing proposals, will ensure that
vulnerable people are able to receive the care they need and that the public is protected from the
few people whose mental disorder renders them dangerous. However, we recognise that this would
not permit compulsion under a Mental Health Act for dangerous people whose judgements are
unimpaired. The BPS does not believe that mental health legislation is an appropriate vehicle in
such circumstances. Instead, psychologists recommend the use of further legal sanctions under the
criminal justice aegis (entirely separate from mental health legislation). These may include the use
of reviewable or indeterminate sentences and of the use of specific treatment orders and
community supervision orders for people identified as being likely to reoffend. Psychologists will
be willing to assist fully in developing these suggestions.
Clinical psychologists have much to offer mental health care and mental health law. They are ready
to take their place as partners with lawyers and psychiatrists. Apologies will have to be given for
the fact that our profession is some 4000 years younger than either law or medicine.
